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THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE PARALOGISM
On December 13th, 1769, George IL, granted a char-
ter to John Wentworth, Governor of the Province of
New Hampshire, Eleazar Wheelock and ten others, incor-
porating them and their successors into Dartmouth Col-
lege, and conferring on them as such college, the power to
appoint professors, prescribe courses of study, sue and
be sued, acquire and dispose of property. The site of op-
erations was to be in the western part of the province.
The college was organized under this charter and has
continued thereunder to this day. In 1816, the legisla-
ture of New Hampshire passed two acts modifying the
composition of the corporation, increasing the number
of members, called trustees, from twelve to twenty-one,
of whom the additional nine were to be appointed by the
Governor of the State, and creating a board of twenty-
five overseers, who should have control over the trus-
tees, and should exercise a large part of the powers hith-
erto possessed by them. The overseers were to be the
president of the senate, the speaker of the house of rep-
resentatives of New Hampshire, the Governor and Lieu-
tenant-Governor of Vermont, and twenty-one other per-
sons to be appointed by the Governor and council of New
Hampshire. The name of the institution was changed
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from Dartmouth College to Dartmouth University. Wood-
ward who had been secretary and treasurer under the
college was appointed to the same place by those who,
under the act of 1816, regarded themselves the corpora-
tion, and accepting office under this aipointment, re-
tained the books, the papers, the charter and the com-
mon seal of the College. A majority of the Trustees of
the College, denying the validity of this legislation, insti-
tuted an action of trover against him, in the State Court.
That court, and the highest court of the State, on appeal,
sustaining the appointment of Woodward, under the
modified charter, the case was removed by writ of error
to the Supreme Court of the United States.1
It was objected against the legislation of 1816, that
it was in excess of the power conferred by the constitu-
tion of New Hampshire upon its legislature, but alleged
transgression of the State constitution presents no Fed-
eral question and the decision of the State judiciary was
on this point conclusive. It was necessary for the plain-
tiff in error to convince the Supreme Court of the United
States, that the legislation of 1816 was in some way vio-
lative of the Federal Constitution.
Among the inhibitions upon States found in the
Constitution of the United States, is that which is found
in Section 10, of Article I: "No State shall * * * pass any
* * * law impairing the obligation of contracts." The
plaintiff in error, Dartmouth College, alleged that the
acts of the New Hampshire legislature of 1816, infringed
this provision. It was necessary for him therefore to
show that the original charter was a contract; that
there cleaved to it an obligation; and that the law re-
formatory of the college impaired this obligation.
What did the word "contract" in the thought of the
framers and adopters of the constitution, mean? In
the Commentaries of Blackstone, which had early a con-
zDartinouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.
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siderable vogue in the American Colonies and States, a
contract is defined "an agreement, upon sufficient con-
sideration, to do or not to do a particular thing."2 "A
contract," said Marshall, C. J., in Fletcher v. Peck,3 is "a
compact between two or more parties, and is either exe-
cutory or executed. An executory contract is one in
which a party binds himself to do or not to do a partic-
ular thing. * * * A contract executed is one in which the
object of contract is performed." The definition, Pow-
ell's, adopted by Washington, J., in the case under con-
sideration, is "a transaction between two or more per-
sons in which each party comes under an obligation to
the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to what-
ever is promised by the other."'
If the charter of December 13th, 1769, was a con-
tract, there must have been at least two parties to it.
Who were they? The grantor was, ostensibly, the king
of Great Britain. Was he, as the individual, the real
party? Or did he act for the political corporation called
Great Britain? Or did he act for the political corpora-
tion known as the Province of New Hampshire? It will
probably not be contended that George HI. granted the
charter as an individual. He held a definite place in the
British constitution; and it was in virtue of his tenure
of that place that he exercised the administrative power
of incorporating in New Hampshire, a subordinate prov-
ince. In applying for incorporation to the distant king,
its Governor Wentworth, and his co-petitioners, conceded
that the power to incorporate was with the king, and not
in the provincial assembly or in Wentworth as the king's
appointee. Although the elaborate opinions of the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, do not distinctly inform us,
22 Comm. 442
32 Cr. 87. This definintion was adopted by Story, J., in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
4Wheat. 518.
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we shall probably not be wrong if we assume that, had
they chosen to answer the question, they would have
said that the king in issuing the charter, acted as the
representative of Great Britain, which if the charter was
a contract, became one of the parties thereto. Marshall,
C. J., assumes that the transcendent power of parlia-
ment to dissolve corporations could have been exerted
upon Dartmouth College1 as upon corporations erected
within Great Britain itself.
Who was the other party to the contract? The
charter was a grant, and the effectiveness of the grant
depended, not merely on the will of the grantor, but also
on that of the grantee, manifested by his acceptance.
The corporation was the product of the joint wills of
grantor and grantee. It was, then, not the grantee. It
could not exist until there had been an acceptance and
there could not be an acceptance, until the acceptor was
in being. The offer of corporate privilege and power,
was made not to the corporation but to Wentworth,
Wheelock and the rest. Both corporate being and the
various corporate powers were offered together, and ac-
cepted together. There was no interval of time between
the coming into existence of the being, and the coming
into existence of these powers; the power, e. g., to sue
and be sued, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, to
lay out a plan of instruction, to appoint professors.2 The
contract, if there was one, was between Great Britain
and Wentworth et aliis. This is realized by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall when he remarks :3  "Those who are no
longer interested in the property (i. e., which was given
to the corporation) may yet retain such an interest in
14 Wheat 643; 651.
Justice Story's remarks, 4 Wheat. 691, though directed to
showing that there was a contract between the crown and the
corporation, do not show it.
3
-Wheat. 630.
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the preservation of their own arrangements (i. e., as de-
fined in the charter) as to have a right to insist that
these arrangements shall be held sacred." Gifts were
made to the College subsequently to 1769, and it is inti-
mated that' Great Britain, through the crown, might be
deemed to make a contract with the donor, at the mak-
ing of such gift, to allow it to be administered by the
agents and in the manner indicated in the charter.
But, as far as appears, the original donees of the
charter, and the subsequent donors to the corporation,
have gone out of existence. Has the charter become,
thereby, a unilateral contract? "If these persons have
disappeared," says Marshall, C. J., "it becomes a subject
of serious and anxious inquiry whether those whom they
have legally empowered to represent them forever, may
not assert all the rights which they possessed, while in
being; whether if they be without personal representa-
tives who may feel injured by a violation of the com-
pact, the trustees be not so completely their representa-
tives, in the eye of the law, as to stand in their place,
not only as respects the government of the college, but
also as respects the maintenance of the college charter."
He later affirms that these persons with whom the
crown has made the compact, "are represented by the
corporation. The corporation is the assignee of their
rights, stands in their place and distributes their bounty
as they would themselves have distributed it, had they
been immortal." A new process of succession is thus
invented; unlike that of a surviving partner, or joint
tenant; or that of an executor or administrator. The
corporation which is the creature of the acceptance by A,
B and C, of a charter granted to them, instantly displaces
them in the contract, which must now be treated as if
madeby the. chartering power with it, and not with them.
By this logical saltation, the corporation is able to allege
that the act by which it came into being is a contract
with itself.
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The other party to the contract was Great Britain.
It continues to exist. Are the obligations of the con-
tract still upon it? A corporation, it has been held, has
a fixed habitation whence it cannot migrate. The col-
lege was a British corporation. While it had no New
Hampshire habitat the college buildings were to be in
that province, instruction was to be imparted there, the
trustees were residents there. Concerning the interest-
ing question how the duties imposed by the contract upon
the crown were transferred to New Hampshire, surpris-
ingly little is said in the discussions of the court. Mar-
shall, C. J., contents himself with the remark: "This is
plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees, and
the crown (to whose rights and obligations New Hamp-
shire succeeds) were the original parties," and Story, J.,
in reply to the suggestion that the charter of the college
was dissolved, at the Revolution, simply says that: "It
is a principle of the common law, which has been recog-
nized as well in this as in other courts, that the division
of an empire works no forfeiture of previously vested
rights of property. And this maxim is equally con-
sonant with the common sense of mankind and the max-
ims of eternal justice."
The question before the court was not, whether the
legislation of 1816 deprived Dartmouth College of "pro-
perty" but whether it impaired the obligation of a con-
tract. If the Revolution had extinguished Great Britain's
contract it had also extinguished the obligation of it.
If it transferred the contract and its obligations to New
Hampshire, there was still possibility of the impairment
of it. Does a revolution effect this transfer? It was
hardly settled that it did, when the case was before the
court, and the question is still far from having reached
a definite solution.1 It is assumed, however, that the
contract on the part of the British crown, to refrain from
ITaylor Internat, Law, 205.
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modifying the composition of the Dartmouth College cor-
poration, in some way attached itself to the new sover-
eignty, New Hampshire, in 1776.
What was the "obligation" of that contract? By
the "obligation" of a contract we are not to understand
the moral obligation to perform it. Strong as is the
State, it cannot destroy moral obligations except such
as are owed to itself, and as it may remit. "Even if it be
admitted," said Trimble, J.,' "that the moral law neces-
sary attaches to the agreement, that would not bring
it within the meaning of the constitution. Moral obli-
gations are those arising from the admonitions of con-
science and accountability to the Supreme Being. No
human law-giver can impair them. They are entirely
foreign from the purposes of the constitution. The
constitution evidently contemplated an obligation which
might be impaired by a law of the state, if not prohibit-
ed by the constitution."
What then is the "obligation" of the contract? Some
agreements the state does not require a party to per-
form. They may be gratuitous. They may not have
been expressed in a prescribed form. They may have
had an unlawful purpose. They may have been procur-
ed by fraud, duress, mistake. Such agreements have
no "obligation." There are agreements which the state
will oblige a party to perform either specifically or oth-
erwise; to do the exact thing defined in the contracts
or some other thing as a compensation for it. It obliges
in various modes. It may imprison the party because
he has not performed or until he does perform. It may
impose fines and other penalties upon him. It may al-
low the creditor to distrain his goods; to take possession
of his land; to sell it, and obtain compensation from the
proceeds. The purpose of the state to furnish these
methods of securing performance, makes performance to
'Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 318.
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a degree necessary, "obliges" performance. The "obli-
gation" of the contract, is the subjection of the party to
the peril of loss, and to the actual loss of liberty or prop-
erty, by the state's power.
A, let us suppose, agrees to pay B, $1,000. If the
state will not coerce A in any way, by arrest, and de-
tention, by seizure or sale of goods or land; if it will not
allow B to punish A for his refusal to pay, to distrain
A's goods, etc., A's promise has obligation "in foro con-
scientiae," but it has no "obligation" in the constitutional
sense. If, however, when the promise is made, the
state's purpose is to allow B, on the failure of A to per-
form, to arrest him, to seize his goods, to use or to sell
them, there is on A an "obligation" to perform. "The
language of the constitution plainly supposes that the
obligation of a contract is something not wholly depend-
ing upon the will of the parties. It incontestably sup-
poses the obligation to be something which attaches to
and lays hold of the contract, and which, by some su-
perior external power, regulates and controls the con-
duct of parties in relation to the contract; it evidently
supposes that superior external power to rest in the will
of the legislature."1
A very little reflection will discover that there can
be no such "obligation" upon a sovereign state or nation.
"Obligation" consists in the purpose and readiness of a
person, natural or artificial, other than the party to the
agreement, to produce disagreeable effects, if the party
omits to do what he has promised. Who stood outside
of and above Great Britain to coerce it into compliance
with its implied promise not to retract or to modify the
charter of Dartmouth College? "The power of a sov-
ereign number," says Austin, "is incapable of legal limit-
1Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; cf. Barnitz v. Beverly,
163 U. S. 118; Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1; McCracken v.
Hayward, 2 How. 608; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311.
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ation. For a monarch or sovereign number bound by
a legal duty would be subject to a higher or superior
sovereign; contrary to the hypothesis involved in the
definition of the terms monarch and sovereign number.
* * * Monarchs and sovereign bodies have attempted to
oblige themselves, or to oblige the successors to their
sovereign powers. But, in spite of such attempts, the
position that sovereign power is incapable of legal limi-
tations holds without exception."' "It being, more-
over," remarks Markby 2 "the essential nature of a duty
that it is the result of a command, it follows that it is
necessarily imposed upon some person other than the
person who issues the command. No man, except by
a strong figure of speech, can be said to issue commands
to himself. Every legal duty, therefore, is imposed by
the sovereign body on some person other than itself.13
A state may admit that it ought to do thus and thus,
and may declare that it will do thus and thus. It may
be already under, or by its acts and promises, it may
put itself under, a moral duty. But this is not the
obligation of a contract. The moral duty it cannot im-
pair by legislation and if it could, there could be no seri-
ous objection anywhere, to the extinction of a moral
duty; for that presumably cannot occur, except with
the consent of God, and we cannot afford to be better
than He. Under other than moral obligations a sover-
eign body politic cannot be.
While the king of Great Britain was its agent for
the granting, he was not its agent for the revoking, of
'Province of Jurisprudence, 150.
2Elements of Law, 92.
aHolland says: "Indeed it is not improper to talk of the State
as having duties, namely such as it prescribes to itself though it
has the physical power to disregard and the constitutional power
to repudiate them." Elements of Juridprudence, p. 109. But
this can mean only that the state ought to do certain things, 'not
that it is under any external stress or compulsion.
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charters. He could not retract a charter.1  But it
would be preposterous to suppose that there was power
nowhere, to cancel or modify a charter once granted.
"A corporation, "said Blackstone,"3 "may be dissolved
by act of parliament, which is boundless in its opera-
tions." Marshall, C. J., concedes, in the case under
investigation, that the British parliament was omnipo-
tent, and that it could "annul corporate rights." Every
charter was, under the British system, merely a revo-
cable license. Those who accepted it, accepted it with
knowledge that it could be recalled whenever the king-
dom acting through parliament, thought fit to do so.
To speak of legal obligation on the British state, to re-
frain from recalling or altering a charter, would be fa-
tuouS. To say even that there was a moral obligation
upon it, to refrain from recalling a charter which the
recipients of it knew to be recallable, would be scarcely
less. In short, prior to the Revolution there was neither
legal nor moral obligation on the part of Great Britain
to allow the charter to continue, or to abstain from
amending it. Wentworth, Wheelock et alii were, and
knew that they were, mere licensees of the kingdom.
Was the revocable nature of the charter changed at
the Revolution? An attempt was made by Webster,
counsel for Dartmouth College, to convince the court that
only the regal and not the parliamentary power with re-
spect to charters, passed to the legislature of New
Hampshire. "The legislature of New Hampshire has,"
he argues, "the same power over this charter which be-
longed to the king, who granted it, and no more." He
does not contend that the whole power of Great Britain
did not pass to the State itself, but simply that the
State had not given to its legislature more of this power,
than Great Britain, under its constitution, had given to
IRex v. Amley, 2 Term R. 532.
31 Comm. 485.
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the king. But this question concerning the partition of
the powers of the State of New Hampshire among the
organs of its government, was a State and not a Federal
question; and the decision of the State court upon this
point could not be examined by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The only question there was not,
Did New Hampshire pass any law? Was the act of its
legislature a law? But did that law impair a contract?
The concession by Chief Justice Marshall is distinct,
that "by the Revolution the duties as well as the powers
of government, devolved on the people of New Hamp-
shire. It is admitted that among the latter was com-
prehended the transcendent power of parliament, as
well as that of the executive department."' It follows
that, as Great Britain could revoke the charter, so could
New Hampshire. There was no legal, there was no
moral obligation on the former to refrain from doing
that which by the immemorial constitution of the king-
dom it could do, and which every person accepting a
charter knew that it could do. As well say that when
A licenses B to cross his field until further notice, the
notice is a breach of duty, as that when a charter is
granted with the knowledge that its continuation de-
pends on the continuation of the volition of the king-
dom, a wrong is done, when that volition ceases. But,
if there could be question as to the moral obligation not
to revoke a charter, there can be none as to the utter
absence of legal obligation. It follows that when in 1776
New Hampshire became an independent State, its con-
tract with the Dartmouth College had no "obligation"
in the constitutional sense of that word. Says Mar-
shall, C. J.: "A repeal of this charter (by New Hamp-
shire) at any time prior to the adoption of the present
Constitution of the United States, would have been an
extraordinary and unprecedented act of power, but one
14 Wheat. 651.
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which could have been contested only by the restriction
upon the legislature, to be found in the constitution of
the State'" It is scarcely needful to observe that the
extraordinariness of a law, is no objection to it, if it be
within the power of the body which passes it. How-
ever unusual the revocation or alteration of a charter
may be, if the power to revoke or alter exists, none can
complain of them. The recipients of the Dartmouth
College charter, took it with knowledge that the British
parliament could repeal it at any time. The corporation
retained it after the Revolution with knowledge that
New Hampshire could repeal it at any time. They knew
that so far as the British kingdom, or the state was
concerned, it was a mere license, which could not be-
come anything else, because it was termed a charter of
incorporation, nor because property was transferred to
the corporation in reliance upon its continuance. Those
who pay a consideration for a revocable license do not
ipso facto render it irrevocable.
New Hampshire ratified the Constitution on June
21st, 1788. Eight States had already ratified it. The
Constitution then, according to its Article VII, was
thereby established. Did this ratification make char-
ters irrepealable, that previously could have been re-
pealed? It is not pretended that there is anything in
the Constitution that could produce this result, save the
section concerning laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts.
It is quite clear that, when a contract made in a
State, has, under its law, no legal obligatoriness, this
clause does not add obligation to it. The State may
still determine the condition under which a contract
shall be binding. It may require that it be expressed
in writing; or that it be sealed, or that there shall be a
consideration, or that the party shall not be a minor,
or of feeble mind, or that it be free from duress. The
Dickinman Law Review
obligation of a contract depends on the law existing
when it is made and that law conditions and limits it.'
No one can make a contract, which under the existing
law will be unenforceable, or which will be enforceable
only to a certain degree, and then insist that it be en-
forced, or enforced beyond the degree, on the ground
that the existing law impaired its obligation. There
must first be an obligation; and this must come from the
law. It is only by later laws that this obligation can be
impaired.2 If, then, the Federal Constitution does not
make obligatory a contract which is not, when made,
obligatory by the State law, how did it happen that it
made obligatory contracts already in existence when it
was adopted, but which by the then State law had not
been of "obligation?" A State, let us suppose, had, in
1787, a law which requires parties to contracts of a cer-
tain class to be 25 years of age: Such a contract with
one under 25 years was in existence on January 1st,
1788. It was not enforceable. The Constitution began
to operate on June 21st, 1788. By What magic did it
impart an obligation to this contract? It forbids a State
law impairing the obligation, but it does not say that
contracts which have heretofore not possessed obligation
shall now possess it, and shall be enforced in State
courts. If the enactment of the Constitution gave ob-
ligation to contracts which did not possess It, to what
sorts of contracts? To those voidable because not
written? To those voidable because of infancy, duress,
fraud, illegality of object, lack of consideration? Why
single out terminable contracts and say that the con-
stitution made them interminable? Or licenses, and
say that they were converted into irrepealable gifts?
'Pinney v. Neilson, 188 U. S. 144.
:Leigh Water Co. v. Borough of Easton, 124 U. S. 8ft;
Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489.
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It was possible for a State, after it had made certain
contracts binding, to remove, or restrict the obligation
of them, and their apparent purpose in adopting the pro-
hibition of clause 10, Art. I, was to deprive themselves
of the power to destroy or curtail an obligation that they
had created. It is difficult to believe that they intended
to make promises themselves to do or refrain from doing
certain things, which were retractable and desti-
tute of obligation, incapable of withdrawal. The
words of the tenth section of Article I. do not attempt
to give "obligation" but to prevent the lessening or ex-
tinction of "obligation" which has been in existence in
virtue of State law.
There is a suggestion by Marshall, C. J., in Fletcher
v. Peck1 that the provision in the 3d Article of the Con-
stitution for Federal judicial power in controversies be-
tween two or more States, between a State and citizens
of another State, between a State and foreign States,
citizens or subjects, implies that Federal coercion may
be brought to bear on a State in order to compel it to
perform its contracts. The reply is furnished by the
Chief Justice himself. The nation did not understand
that it had given power to the central judiciary to co-
erce a State at the suit of an individual or corporation,
and as soon as it realized that that judiciary was of
opinion that it had, the Eleventh Amendment destroyed
the pretense of such power.
The suggestion was made by Story, J., that if a
State reserved, when granting a charter, the right to
terminate or modify it, such termination or modification
would be within its competence. The suggestion was
early acted upon. It became the fashion for legislatures
to pass general laws to the effect that all charters there-
16 Cr. 87.
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after granted should be repealable or alterable' and
State constitutions contain a similar provision. The
only object of such a law or constitution is, to give no-
tice to all persons that charters granted will be subject
to the power of recall or modification. How does it mat-
ter in what form this notice is given? Many constitu-
tional principles are unwritten, but are as well known
and as operative, as if written. That one legislature
can repeal an act of an earlier legislature, that an act of
Congress can repeal an earlier treaty are
unwritten principles. It was as clearly fixed
under the British constitution, that parliament
was omnipotent, and that any charter might
be revoked or changed by it. This principle lay
behind all special acts of legislation. What greater
sanction would it have obtained, if it had been expressed
in a statute? Or what better notice would the recipient
of a charter have had of it? This principle, of the re-
pealability of a charter, passed, with sovereignty, to
New Hampshire, and every one obtaining a charter from
the State, or operating under one of British grant, was
as well aware that it might be withdrawn at any time,
as if a thousand statutes had declared that it might. It
is somewhat puerile to distinguish between an express
and an implied condition, and especially when the ex-
pression of the condition may be in an ancient statute
or constitution, and not in the charter itself. If every
purchaser of a charter must know the old statute which
says that all charters shall be revocable, why should
he not be compelled to know, what is equally knowable,
the unwritten, a priori political principle, that the State
cannot "oblige" itself; and that all its charters may be
recalled? He is bound to know that the police power 2
'Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489; Greenwood v. Union
Freight R. R. Co., 105 U. S. 13.
2Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746;
Cooley Const. Inn. 399.
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or the eminent domain, cannot be bargained away al-
though neither statute nor constitution so declares, and
that charters are received subject to the exercise there-
of.3 Why is he not bound to know that the State also
grants its charters subject to the condition that they
can be at any time revoked?
Dartmouth College v. Woodward has prevented the
alteration or revocation of the charters that had been
issued prior to the decision. In so far as it has made
control of corporations by the States impossible, its ef-
fect has been largely pernicious. It has tended to
exalt chartered associations above the State and the
people. If the device of charming the court into inno-
cuousness, by the use of constitutional or statutory as-
sertions of repealability, had not been adopted, a rever-
sal of the decision would have been imperatively neces-
sary. By the use of this device, for fifty years the
State's power over its corporations has been as great
as if the decision had never been rendered, at the cost
simply of the enactment, either by the people or by
the assemblies, of a general declaratory phrase. Few
constitutional adjudications have been more talked
about, and few have been more inept.
'Cooley Const. Lirm. 397.
3fleer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Douglas v. Ken.
tucky, 168 U. S. 483.
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MOOT COURT
T EMKE v. FOLEY
Suretyship-Failure to Revive Judgment by the Surety
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chillingworth borrowed $1,000 from Temke and assigned to
him a judgment he had for $1,200 against Tucker. Foley In
writing agreed to be responsible for C's payment of $1,000 when
the debt fell due. Temke has allowed the lien of the judgment
against Tucker to lapse by failing duly to revive it, so that noth-
ing can be recovered from Tucker. This is a suit by Temke upon
Foley's contract of suretyship.
Gorson, for plaintiff.
Goldman, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FELDMAN, J. We must first decided whether Foley was
really a surety for the payment of the loan to Temke. By the
suretyship act of 1913, 5 Purdon 6259, "every written agreement
made by one person to answer for, the default of another shall
subject such person to the liability of suretyship and shall con-
fer upon him the rights incident thereto, unless such agreement
shall contain in substance the words 'this is not intended to be
a contract of suretyship'."
Since nothing appears in the agreement contrary to Ihe
act of 1913, it is settled that Foley is a surety.
The question presented in the case is whether a creditor
having a judgment assigned to him as collateral security and by
his failure duly to revive the judgment allows the same to lapse,
-will discharge the surety from liability.
It is a well settled principle that if a creditor without the
consent of the surety affirmatively releases the collateral secur-
ity, the surety is discharged. But the principle is not definite-
ly decided in all of the states, where a loss is claimed through
the inactivity of the creditor.
There are two views as to the nature. of the creditor's duty
to the surety with respect to the collateral security, (1) that
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there is no duty of active vigilance; (2) that tbhe creditor holds
the collateral as trustee.
The former is -more preferable. That the duty of activity
is rather upon the surety than upon the creditor seems more reas-
onable, when we consider what Uhe word surety means.
Bouvier defines a surety as "a person who binds himself for
the payment of a sum of money, or for the performance of some
duty, upon the default of another person."
Foley by becoming a surety for Chillingworth, places himself
in the position of the original debtor. Now can he claim to be
discharged from such liability, merely because Temke who had
the judgment as collAseral security, leaves same untouched?
A decision rendered in favor of the defendant, would only
tend to abbrogate a surety's liability when a creditor has col-
lateral security, and remains inactive as to such security. It
was Foley's business to have looked after the revival of the
judgment by reminding Temke to act when the judg-
ment was about due. Should Temke then fail to -heed such
warning, and allow ithe judgment to lapse, Foley would not be
expected to pay, and his liability would absolutely be discharg-
ed. But Foley said nothing. Judging from the circumstan-
ces, Foley became a surety not to pay upon the default of Chil-
lingworth, but merely to become a party to the transaction,
without incurring any liability. He seems to have relied en-
tirely upon Temke's revival of Ithe judgment.
'Morrison vs. Hartman, 14 Pa. 56, holds "a creditor who lets
the means of satisfaction slip from his hands, discharges his
debtor's surety, but mere supineness will not do this."
United States vs. Simpson, 3 P. & W. 439, states, "the eurdty
was not discharged though the creditor 'had suffered rthe lien of
a judgment against the principal to expire. Had the surety
in the instance required the creditor to proceed on his execu-
tion, the case would have been different, but it was the business
of the surety to look after his own interest.
C. J. Gibson in 'his opinion, states, "the rule is well settled
that mere forebearance however prejudicial to the surety will
not discharge him from liability. It is his peculiar business to
judge of the danger to be apprehended from delay, and to quick-
en -the creditor where the occasion requires it, in the way known
to law, in default of which the loss incurred is necessarily to be
attriblted to 'his own supineness."
In Kindt's Appeal, 102 Pa. 441, Mr. Justice Green held,
'Mere supineness would not prejudice his right to resort to the
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surety unless the latter notified him to proceed. It would be
strange indeed if under such circumstances (as were present in
this case) an omission to revive against a subsequent alienee
of the land should deprive the creditor of -his right of recovery
against the surety. 1t has been repeatedly held that even when
the judgment creditor fails entirely to revive his judgment
against the debtor and thereby lost its lien altogether against
the land of the debtor, such omission was not a defense to the
surety."
Winton vs. Lifttle, 94 Pa. 64, holds that, "mere forebearance
-however prejudicial to a surety will not discharge him. The
-ailure of a creditor to revive a judgment does not discharge a
surety, unless there was an express agreement.
In Campbell vs. Sherman, 151 Pa. 70, the facts were as
follows: J. A. Homet bought of Adam Sherman, two judgments
against Robbins for $592.38; at the same time he loaned to Sher-
man $266.62. To secure the payment of the judgments and the
money loaned he received the bond of Sherman in the sum of
;859.00 on which judgment was entered in 1887. Sher-
man became insolvent. The appellant Homet claimed the
amount of his lien. The other creditors admitted that the ap-
pellant was entitled to receive the sum loaned and interest, but
contended that herman was released from liability as to the
balance because of the appellant's failure to revive Robbins' judg-
ments. To this the appellant answered that his omission to re-
vive these judgments did not release Sherman. The Supreme
Court held that, if he was a surety he was not released from lia-
bility by the negligence of the appellant.
It is well settled that mere forebearance, however prejudicial
to a surety, will not discharge him, and that the failure of a
creditor to revive a judgment does not release Ithe surety unless
there ywas an express agreement that it should be kept revived
for his benefit.
In view of the above stated authority we render a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The judgment of lower court is affirmed.
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NATIONAL BANK v. JOLMAN
Evidence-Hanidwriting-Estoppel-Admsaions
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on note for $500.00 purporting to be made by Jolman.
Jolman denied his execution of the note. The plaintiff called
X, who testified that he had seen a signature which Jolman ad-
mitted to him to be his, Jolman's, and that he was thus acquaint-
ed with Jolman's handwriting, and believed the signature to the
note in suit to have been written by Jolman. The plaintiff also
proved by Y, that the bank's officer, after It had discounted the
note in suit, had shown it to Jolman, who, after due examination
of it, said it was genuine. The Court told the jury that if they
believed Y, Jolman was estopped to deny his signature, and that,
if they did not believe Y, they might still believe the note genu-
ine, if X's testimony convinced them. Verdict for plaintiff.
Defendant appeals.
Schneider, for plaintiff.
Wilson, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
OLSHEFSKY, J. The assignment of error presented to this
court is that the judge in the lower court erred in his charge
to the jury. But before considering the charge to the juty, we
will first dispose of the question raised by the plaintiff in error
as to whether or not the testimony of X Is admissible.
Bolles on Pennsylvania Law of Neg. and Non-Neg. Iust., p.
404, says, "After ta witness testifies to seeing the signature of
the maker of a note which he (the maker) .admitted to be genu-
ine, he is permitted to give his opinion concerning the genuine-
ness of the maker's signature to the note in controversy." This
doctrine was likewise laid down in Second National Bank v.
Wentzel, 1-51 Pa. 142. The amount of credibility to be attached
to the opinion of such witness is for the jury to determine. We
therefore think that the lower court did not err in admitting X's
testimony and in charging the jury that "they could bring in a
verdict for the plaintiff if X's testimony convinced them."
The lower court in telling the jury that, "if they believed
Y, Jolman was estopped to deny his signature," not only com-
mitted a gross injustice to the defendant, but also acted in con-
travention to the well established principles and doctrine of
estoppel as laid down for years by the courts of this country
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and England. In order to create an equitable estoppel there
must exist a false representation or concealment of material
facts; made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts;
the party to whom it was made must have been without knowl-
edge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; it must be
made with an intention that it shall be acted upon; and the
party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted upon
it to his prejudice. It is therefore essential to an equitable es-
toppel that the person asserting the estoppel shall have done,
or omitted some act, or changed his position, in reliance upon the
representations or conduct of the person sought to be estopped.
It is clear from the facts of the case at bar that the application
of such an estoppel here cannot be justified. The plaintiffs were
not misled to any injury nor did they suffer any substantial loss
by reason of Jolman's admission. The note was discounted
before the alleged admission was made. The bank had al-
ready parted with the money on the note. Their position was
not altered in any material respect by the admission. It seems
that the bank, in order to place itself on firm ground for the
action which it intended to commence, extorted an ante litem
motam admission from the defendant, Jolman. Likewise, it
does not appear under what circumstances the admission was
made. Such an dmnision as Jolman was alleged to have made
is not conclusive but is always rebuttable by proof of mistake,
or other cause.
In Weaver v. Lynch, 25 Pa. 451, the court held, "It is a
rule as ,well settled as it is just, that if an obligor induces a per-
son to take an assignment of his note or bond by admitting the
justice of the debt, or declaring that he has no defence, -he can-
not afterwards deny it to the prejudice of the assignee. But 'the
assignee must also be able to show that the admission was made
before he expended his money in procuring the assignment.
Anything said afterwards can do (him) no harm, because it could
not be his motive for making the purchase, and therefore it
shall not affect the other party by way of estoppel."
That the court erred in its attempt to enunciate the law of
estoppel need be cited; Second National Bank v. Wentzell, 151 Pa.
142; Cohen v. Teller, 93 Pa. 123; Miller v. Cresson, '5 W. & S.
284; Comm. v. MIoltz, 10 Barr (Pa.) 527. The defendant could
not be estopped by anything said to the officer of the bank un-
less notice was in sone way brought to him that the bank was
about to act upon the faith of his declaration.
Bolles on Pennsylvania Law of Neg. and Non-Neg. Inst p.'
407, says, "If a maker or indorser is shown a note held by a
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bank and admits that his signature as maker is genuine, though
it is a forgery, -he will not be estopped in an action on the note
from proving the forgery. The admission does not operate as
an estoppel because the bank has already parted with its
money, and its conduct is therefore not affected by his declawa-
tion." Bigelow on Estoppel, 485-491; Randolph on Commercial
Paper, Vol. 2, p. 2512. Herman, Estoppel, sec. 991, 996. That
this law on estoppel is in accordance with that of other jurisdic-
tions; Wallis v. Truesdell, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 455; Whitney v.
Holmes, 15 Mass. 152; Welland v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. (N. Y.)
480-2; Sheller v. McKenney, 17 Ill. App. 185; Starr v. Yourtee,
17 Md. 341; Hackett v. Callender, 32 Vt. 97; Morgan v. Spang-
ler, 14 Ohio 102; Danforth v. Adams, 29 Conn. 107; Taylor v.
Ely, 25 Conn. 250.
This court is therefore clearly of the opinion that the lower
court erred in its instructions to -the jury, and that the case
should go back for a new trial.
Judgment Teversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
OPINION OF THE SUPEIIOR COURT
The instruction of the trial court, that the jury might
believe X's testimony, and that, if they did, they might find
a verdict for the plaintiff was correct. A witness may have
seen only one specimen of a man's handwriting, and, remember-
ing its characteristics, may form an opinion, that the writing in
question was produced by the same person. The witness may
know the typical writing to be that of the defendant, though not
having seen 'him write, by his admission that it was produced
by him.
The learned court below has properly determined that there
was error in the instruction concerning estoppel. Yolman's
admission that he wrote the note was competent evidence. If
the jury believed the bank officer, it would probably have had
no difficulty in concluding that the note was genuine. But, the
instruction allowed the jury to render a verdict for the bank,
even if the note was not genuine. It told the jury in substance,
that if Jolman made the statement to the bank officer, that the
officer asserts that he made, the verdict must be for the plain-
tiff, whdther they believed that Johnan wrote the note or not.
The bank had already discounted the note. The statement
of Jolman, even if untrue could have done the bank no harm.
Acting in reliance on-the statement made Is necessary to estop
the party making it, from lisputing the truth of that statement.
Hence the judgment is affirmed.
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HUDSON' v. CITIZEN'S BANK
Bank's Liability to Depositor-Forged Endorsement - Delayed
Notice of Forgery
STATEMENT OF FAMTS
Hudson drew a check for $1000 upon Defendant, payable to
Charles Moreley and handed it to Moreley. Moreley lost the
check, which was found by some one who, pretending to be More-
ley indorsed it in Ithat name. The bank knew neither this per-
son nor Moreley, but believing the former on his own statement
to be Moreley, paid the money and charged the account of Hud-
son with the amount paid. It was 17 days after payment that
Hudson learned the wrong person had presented the check. It
was 3 weeks after that, before Hudson informed the bank. The
bank however became aware of the impersonation and forgery 2
days after payment of check, but had said nothing about it to
Hudson. This action of assumpsit for $1000.
Quinn, for plaintiff.
Raub, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JOBLIN, J. We think the question to be decided in this
case is whether at first the bank was negligent in paying $1000
to one purporting to be Moreley, whom they did not know, or
whether the plaintiff was negligent in not notifying bank of for-
gery as soon as he discovered it, instead of waiting 3 weeks, or
whether the bank on getting knowledge of forgery 2 days after
it occurred made it unnecessary for the plaintiff to give them
notice.
A bank is required to know the signatures of its depositors.
In the case at bar, this signature was genuine, but the indorse-
ment false, and by the man declaring himself to be the indorser
the bank was deceived. The bank made no investigation, but
paid the $1000 upon request of the stranger. We think in doing
this the bank was negligent, having made no effort to have the
payee identified. The check was for $1000 and the bank should
have made efforts to have the payee Identified in some man-
ner. This conslituted the first act of negligepce by the bank
who we think did not use reasonable care in paying the check.
But however careful the bank was in paying the check it Is
answerable for money paid on a forgery unless so paid thru neg-
ligence of depositor. 6 Cyc. 644.
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We do not dispute the fact that a 'depositor becoming aware
of a forgery must repudialte same at once ,or within a reasonable
time. 252 Pa. 304.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff is not barred from recover-
ing amount paid on the forged instrument, altho he may have
been negligent in not earlier notifying the bank, because the
bank by Its own discovery, had notice 15 days before the de-
positor, two days after payment of the check. In present case,
the defendant bank received notice 15 days before plaintiff, of
whom the bank claims immediate notice of the forgery as nec-
essary for a- recovery of the $1000.
But this ndtice is immaterial. The negligence of the bank
prevents its taking advantage of subsequent negligence of plain-
tiff and it anust pay back the money paid on forged check. The
negligence charged to the plaintiff, namely, not notifying bank
at once of forgery, does not dispense with necessity of care and
diligence on part of bank or exempt it from consequences of its
own negligence. 7 Dickinson Law Review 20.
The bank in this case suffered loss thru their own negligence
and want of skill in a matter as to which, it in first instance
received notification. 171 N. Y. 219. In all cases where deposit-
or' has been deprived of his right to recover, depositor has been
negligent in informing bank of forgery of which they had no pre-
vious notice. But by facts in case at bar 'defendant had re-
ceived. actual notice 15 days before plaintiff. A second notifi-
ation therefore we think is unnecessary. Bank had ample notice
and time to obtain idemnity from person receiving the money
under Act of 1849, and by its negligence in not doing so, the
plaintiff should not suffer, but bank must bear the loss and
plaintiff be allowed to recover in this action.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It has been frequently asserted by the courts of Pennsylva-
nia that where a depositor fails promptly to inform his bank
that it has paid one of his checks upon a forged in~orsement, he
will be regarded as having withheld from the bank a substan-
tial right and will be precluded from recovering from the bank
and the latter need not prove that such delay actually resulted in
material injury to it. Marsks v. Anchor Savings Bank, 252
Pa. 304; McMeley Co. v. Bank, 221 Pa. 288.
The reasons upon which this rule is based show, however,
that it has no application to a ease like the present where the
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bank knew that it had paid upon a forged indorsement before
the depositor. This appears from the language of the court in
MeMeley Co. v. Bank. " The right of a bank to recover from &
forger, or from those to whom it may have paid a check bearing
the forged signature of one of its depositors, or a forged in-
dorsement is its only remedy for the fraud practiced upon it by
the forgery. The depositor's money is not affected by
it, and -when he Is the first to discover it, it is
not reasonable that he should not be required to give prompt
notice of it to the bank, if he intends to hold the depository liable
for the mispayment * * * The depositor can gain nothing by
withholding knowledge of the forgery, but the bank, if kept in
ignorance. of it, after his discovery of it, may lose everything.
As soon as a bank learns that it has paid a check on a forged
indorsement it is its duty to promptly restore to the depositors
account what was improperly taken from it, and its right at the
same time is to proceed against those who wrongfulIy got the
money. Where a depositor knowingly withholds from it knowl-
edge without which it cannot proceed to protect itself, he ought
to be regarded as having withheld from it a substantial right."
McNeely v. Bank.
Judgment affirmed.
HEARST v. APPLETON
Corporation--Confidential Relation Between Officer and Stock.
holder
STATEMENT OF FACM
Appleton was president of a corporation, X, which was
about to make a sale of all its property to another corporation,
Y, at a price which would make the shares of X worth twice
their par. Hearst, a stockholder, owning fifty shares, was of-
fered the par for them in ignorance of the impending sale and of
its certain effect on the value of the shares. Hearst alleging
that it was the duty of Appleton to have disclosed this fact,
sues for the difference between the par and the value as in-
creased by the sale.
Little, for plaintiff.
Harman, for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
HOLDERBAUM, J. The question in issue is whether or
not Appleton was duty bound to make known to the stockholders
the impending sale of the corporation's stock and its certain ef-
fect upon the value of the shares.
The obligations of the president of a corporation in his
judiciary capacity rest upon the same footing as those of the
directors. 10 Cyc. 919. While the directors are trustees for the
share holders, considered as an aggregate body, in respect .to
the the conservation of the corporate property and the manage-
ment of the corporation business, yet they do not sustain such
a relation to ithem severally, as will subject them to the rules
governing dealings between a trustee and his cestui que trust.
Thompson on Corporations, see. 4034.
As, in theory of law, directors are strangers to stockholders
individually. 10 Cyc. 825. They can be held liable to them only
for direct wrongs in the nature of misfeasance. 10 Cyc. 824.
The weight of authority is in accordance with Crowell v.
Jackson, 2aAtlantic Reptr. 426, which held, the purchase bf
stock from a stockholder at a low price by an officer of a cor-
poration was not fraudulent, altho the officers had knowledge in
his official capacity of favorable sales of other stock which en-
hanced the value of the stock and of which fact the seller was
ignorant.
Altho, Oliver v. Oliver, 118 G. 362, cited by the plaintiff, is
a well considered case in contradiction to the above rule, it is
inapplicable to the case at bar. The Georgia court imposed the
duty upon the officer of the corporation to disclose material facts
tb the stockholder when purchasing the stock himself.
In the case at bar the purchaser was a third person and
there is not only no evidence of collusion between the president
and the purchaser but not even of the slightest inducement of the
seller by the president. Therefore we are of the opinion that
the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant.
Inasmuch as the court can grant no remedy to the plaintiff,
we consider that the question of equitable jurisdiction raised by
the defendant is immaterial and needs not be determined here.
Judgment is accordingly given for the defendant.
OPDNION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It seems quite unsatisfactory to hold that, When a man has
been elevated into the directorate or the presidency of a corpora-
tion, but the other stockholders, he can take advantage of
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the knowledge acquired in that position, of the policy of the cor-
poration, and of its probable or certain effect on the value of the
shares, to purchase shares from the stockholders who are igno-
rant of the policies and of their effects on the value of their
shares, at prices far below the value what will be produced by
the execution of this policy. We cannot but think that an in-
structed conscience would lead the courts to forbid the directors'
or the president's taking advantage of the ignorance of the
stockholder, in purchasing for less than the value which he
knows will inhere in the stock, as soon as the contemplated
policy, is executed. It ought to matter nothing, whether we
say the director is towards the individual stockholder, a trustee
or not. He will be a trustee, if the courts say that he is. They
have said that he is such towards the whole body of stockholders,
as a means of expressing that he is under certain duties to the
latter. They might very equitably have said that he owes to the
individual stockholder the duty not to buy shares of the latter at
a price less than -what, as soon as the action contemplated by
him and his fellow directors is taken, they will command, if the
stockholder is ignorant of the contemplated action.
However, the authorities seem to hold that the director or
president may, if he does not actively mislead the stockholder,
buy his shares at any price the latter may be willing to take,
though he is known to be ignorant of the events which have oc-
curred or are inpending and which will enhance the value of these
shares.
Supporting this view is Board of Commissioners v. Rey-
nolds, 44 Ind. 509; Canfield & Worrnsers Oases on Corporations,
510; Cf. also Krumbhoar v. Griffiths, 151 Pa. 223.
The judgment of -the learned court below, :for the defendant,
is therefore affirmed.
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NEWELL v. FISHER
Evidence - Telephonic Communication - Contract - Intoxica-
tion as Defense
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fisher while intoxicated, telephoned to Newell to send wine
-worth $300 to one Hess and charge it to Fisher. Newell did
so and Hess reclved and used the wine. Fisher was too in-
toxicated to know what -he was doing but his condition was not
suspected by Newell.
Morford, for the plaintiff.
Swope, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LEMISCH, J. The first question ,which .presents itself is
concerning the admissibility of the plaintiff's testimony. The
authorities seem to agree that conversations over the telephone
are admissible in evidence if the voice is fully and satisfactorily
identified as that of the alleged speaker. It is said in Wig-
more's Evidence, p. 755, that, "a witness may testify to a per-
son's identity from his voice alone."
The question is whether Newell was sufficiently familiar
with Fisher's voice to have relied on it to the extent of delivering
the goods to Hess. We think not, as the case does not state wheth-
er or not Fisher was in the habit of ordering goods by telephone
-rom Newell; and if he was or not, is not a question for the court
to decide but for the jury.
In 27 Am. and Eng. Ency., 1091, the law is stated as follows:
"Conversations conducted through the medium of the telephone
do not differ in their essential characteristics from other verbal
communications; their admissibility and effect as evidence are
therefore governed by the same legal principles which apply in
cases of ordinary oral declarations. The instrument merely en-
ables the parties to carry on their conversations at a greater
distance than under ordinary circumstances." To the same ef-
fect is Southwork National Bank of Philadelphia v. Smith, 21
Pa. C. C. 1.
In view of the above, we think the telephonic communication
is admissible in evidence.
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The second question involved in this case is whether the con-
tract of sale made by Fisher while in an intoxicated condition,
so as not to know what he was doing, is valid or not.
In 17 Am. and Eng. Ency., 399, the rule is laid down that,
where the obligor of a contract enters into it, while intoxicated to
a degree which disqualifies his mind to comprehend the subject of
the contract, its nature and probable consequences, he is entitled
to set up his condition as a defense to an action on the contract
as a ground to set it aside. A like doctrine was also laid down
in Bush v. Breinig, 113 Pa. 310; and Noel v. Karper, 53 Pa. 97.
It was also held in Hawkins v. Bone, 4 F. & F. 311, a leading
English case; that if the purchaser was so drunk as not to know
the nature of the acts he was doing, the contract of sale was
void, whether or not the seller knew his condition at the time,
tho his knowledge of it may be material in regard to damages.
Newell was a party to the contract, and it was his business
to know the condition of the party with whom he contracted.
But Newell did not take proper precautions to ascertain whether
Fisher was intoxicated or not, or whether he was a person of in-
temperate habits, or whether he was able to pay for the goods
ordered, and so to a great extent Newell was a victim of his own
neglect.
The rule formerly was that intoxication was no excuse, and
created no privilege or plea in avoidance of a contract; but it is
now settled according to the dictates of good sense and justice,
that a contract made by a person so destitute of reason as not
to know the consequences of his contract, tho his incompetency
be produced by intoxication, is voidable and may be avoided by
himself, tho the intoxication was voluntary and not procured by
the circumvention of the other party. 2 Kent Comm. 451.
A drunkard when in a complete state of intoxication, so as
not to know what he is doing, has no capacity to contract in gen-
eral; but his contract is voidable only and not void and may there-
fore he ratified or avoided by him when he becomes sober. Ben-
jamin on Sales, p. 42.
On the facts as presented in this case, we are of the opinion
that judgment must be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
We -are unable to reach the conclusion propounded by the
learned court below.
Fisher ordered Newell to send goods worth $300 to Hess,
promising to pay for them. Newell sent the goods; which, hay-
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ing been consumed, are no longer recoverable. Fisher refuses
to pay for them because he was drunk when he sent the order.
But, he was not in contract with Newell, when he made the
order. Newell did not see him; saw no signs of drunkenness
in the message by telephone. Was he bound to suspect that
Fisher was drunk? Surely not. Not one man in a hundred is
drunk when he gives an order. It is not encumbent on one to
think that the person with whom he is dealing, is this excep-
tional man.
Should then one who receiving an order, complies with it, on
the orderer's promise to compensate him, be precluded from re-
covering this compensation because of the intoxication? To the
question of Williams, J., in State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Pa. 204, "If
a man voluntarily deprives himself of the use of his reason by
strong drink, why should he not be responsible to an innocent
party for the acts which he performs when in that condition?",
the only answer is, he should be responsible. He was held re-
sponsible to an innocent purchaser of a promissory note, made by
him when drunk.
Had the contract been unexecuted, the court might very prop-
erly have refused to compel specific performance. Such was Bush
v. Breinig, 113 Pa. 310. When drunk, Breinig had contracted to
buy land from Bush. When he became sober, he demanded to
rescind the contract, and to recover the part of the purchase
money which he had paid while drunk. He was allowed to rescind
and recover. No damage was inflicted on an innocent party with
whom Breinig dealt.
It would be a shock to business men to hold that a man
could procure by telephone or letter or otherwise, from one not
suspecting that he was drunk, goods, and then consume them,
and then refuse to pay for them. Here the goods were consumed
by Hess, Fisher's protege, or deputy. Fisher must pay for them.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
